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Abstract: This paper mainly explores how law-based neo-functionalism can contribute to 
explain the legal development of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or 
Euratom) in the last decades. The neo-functionalist approach developed by Burley (Slaughter) 
and Mattli in the 1990s expects spill-overs because it assumes that subnational actors try to 
overcome national law in order to pursue their interests by means of preliminary proceedings 
before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It also presumes political dynamics as a 
consequence of a general strategy of the European Commission to widen the scope of the 
EAEC’s and/or its competences by means of actions against member states. By analysing ECJ 
case law on Euratom, the paper shows that the mechanisms and phenomena highlighted by 
this particular neo-functionalist approach do not occur in the case of the EAEC. It is 
concluded that a revised version of law-based neo-functionalism which takes into account, 
inter alia, context factors such as the interdependence of deregulation and reregulation is 
likely to have more explanatory power.  
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1.  Introduction 
In 1993, Anne-Marie Burley (Slaughter) and Walter Mattli published their seminal article 
“Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration” which obviously strongly 
influenced the title and content of this paper. Burley/Mattli (1993) and Mattli/Slaughter 
(1995, 1998) outline a theory of law-based neo-functionalism that intends to explain the spill-
over dynamics and constitutionalisation of European integration by combining the neo-
functionalist model developed by Haas (1958) and others (see Renner 2009 for additional 
references) with legal approaches that focus on the more or less hidden political and 
instrumental power of supranational law.  
We find that the independent variables posited by neo-functionalist theory provide a 
convincing and parsimonious explanation of legal integration. We argue that just as 
neo-functionalism predicts, the drivers of this process are supranational and 
subnational actors pursuing their own self-interests within a politically insulted sphere. 
The distinctive features of this process include a widening of the ambit of successive EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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legal decisions according to a functional logic, a gradual shift in the expectations of 
both government institutions and private actors participating in the legal system, and 
the strategic subordination of immediate individual interests of member states to 
postulated collective interests over the long term (Burley/Mattli 1993: 43-44). 
As a result of the strategic use of the European Union’s judicial system by supranational 
actors (especially the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) itself) 
and subnational actors (e.g. individuals, companies, associations, national courts), the EU’s 
quasi-constitutionalisation (Weiler 1999) has deepened and the scope of policies directly or 
indirectly influenced by European Community (EC) law has rapidly grown over the last 
decades: 
The evolution of community law also has manifested the substantive broadening 
typical of functional spill-over. EC law is today no longer as dominantly economic in 
its character as in the 1960s. It has spilled over into a variety of domains dealing with 
issues such as health and safety at work, entitlements to social welfare benefits, mutual 
recognition of educational and professional qualification, and, most recently even 
political participation rights (Burley/Mattli 1993: 66). 
Burley (Slaughter) and Mattli do not discuss whether their argumentation applies to all areas 
of EU law (Mattli/Slaughter 1998: 184). They confine their analysis to the (former) European 
Community, as most scholars working on European integration at the intersection of political 
science and law do (see e.g. Alter 2001; Joerges 2003; Scharpf 2003; Weiler 1999). However, 
quantitative studies show that the impact of ECJ case law on the member states varies 
between policy fields (e.g. Conant 2001). Thus, political scientists and lawyers should no 
longer limit their research to analysing the “European Court’s Political Power” (Alter 1996) 
or the central elements of the “Constitution of Europe” (Weiler 1999). According to 
Mattli/Slaughter (1998: 206), scholars should rather “address the impact of EU law on 
European economic, political, and social integration. Such studies must proceed issue area by 
issue area”. 
Against this backdrop, this paper deals with a particular field of European integration which is 
usually disregarded by researchers of nearly all scientific disciplines: the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). Since the European nuclear energy policy has only 
sparsely developed over the last decades (Wolf 2009), it seems worthwhile to analyse whether 
and how the dynamics and logics described by Burley (Slaughter) and Mattli materialised in 
this specific issue area (Renner 2009 applies the original neo-functionalist approach to the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and other energy-related policies, but not to 
Euratom). 
This paper does not intend to continue or reopen the neo-functionalist-intergovernmentalist 
debate (as to the role of law, see e.g. Garrett 1995; Mattli/Slaughter 1995, 1998; on endless 
controversies between neo-functionalist and intergovernmental approaches, see Scharpf 2000: 
5). It is obvious that intergovernmentalism has an excellent and unparalleled explanatory 
power with regard to Euratom since the EAEC, unlike other EU policies, is clearly dominated EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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by the member state governments (Moravcsik 1998; Sauter 2009; Weilemann 1983). Thus, 
this contribution deliberately does not deal with intergovernmentalism and does not aim to 
draw a systematic comparison between the explanatory power of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism with respect to Euratom. Moreover, it does not intend to detect all 
factors that might account for  the EAEC’s meagre legal development in the past. 
Intergovernmentalist studies provide good explanations in this regard, and examinations of 
ecological, economical and technical framework conditions yield additional insights (Wolf 
2009). However, these approaches cannot explain why the specific mechanisms and 
phenomena postulated by law-based neo-functionalism do not seem to (fully) work in the case 
of Euratom. Therefore, this paper aspires, inter alia, to identify eventual inherent weaknesses 
of the original approach developed by Burly (Slaughter) and Mattli and to suggest conceptual 
improvements. It is hoped that a refined version of law-based neo-functionalism can provide 
complementary insights regarding the legal development of Euratom and other policies. 
Since Euratom is hardly known even by European integration experts, the next section 
provides a short historical, legal and political overview of the EAEC. Then two key 
assumptions of law-based neo-functionalism are presented. The approach developed by 
Burley (Slaughter) and Mattli expects spill-overs because it assumes that subnational actors 
try to overcome national law in order to pursue their interests by means of preliminary 
proceedings before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It also presumes political dynamics 
as a consequence of a general strategy of the European Commission to widen the scope of the 
EAEC’s and/or its competences by means of actions against member states. These two 
theoretical assumptions guide the subsections in which ECJ case law on Euratom is analysed. 
In the concluding section, it is argued, inter alia, that the meagre legal development of the 
EAEC can be explained to a certain degree by inherent limitations of Euratom primary law. 
According to this perspective, lacking legal preconditions hamper or prevent political and 
legal dynamics that could be triggered by interdependent processes of deregulation and 
reregulation. 
2.  Euratom – a short overview 
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community is one of the two “Treaties 
of Rome” which were negotiated in the mid-1950s, signed in 1957 and went into force on 1 
January 1958 for an unlimited period (on intergovernmental package deals including the 
parallel negotiations of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), 
see Moravcsik 1998 and Weilemann 1983). Jean Monnet, one of the masterminds of the 
ECSC which had been established a few years earlier (Renner 2009: 8), strongly preferred 
Euratom to the EEC. From his point of view, sectoral and technical integration in the field of 
nuclear energy policy seemed to be much more promising than cross-sectoral economic 
integration (Duchêne 1994; Monnet 1976). Security of supply, competitiveness and 
environmental sustainability are guiding principles of energy policy (Grunwald 2003: 87-92). 
Euratom shall be conducive to achieving these general objectives. Thus, the EAEC’s main EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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task is “to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member States and to the 
development of relations with the other countries by creating the conditions necessary for the 
speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries” (Art. 1 of the Euratom Treaty). 
According to Art. 2, the Community shall 
a.   promote research and ensure the dissemination of technical information; 
b.   establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the 
general public and ensure that they are applied; 
c.   facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encouraging ventures on the 
part of undertakings, the establishment of the basic installations necessary for 
the development of nuclear energy in the Community; 
d.   ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply 
of ores and nuclear fuels; 
e.   make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not 
diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended; 
f.   exercise the right of ownership conferred upon it with respect to special fissile 
materials; 
g.   ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities by the 
creation of a common market in specialized materials and equipment, by the 
free movement of capital for investment in the field of nuclear energy and by 
freedom of employment for specialists within the Community; 
h.   establish with other countries and international organizations such relations as 
will foster progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
In its second title, the Euratom Treaty contains 10 chapters or sub-policies “for the 
encouragement of progress in the field of nuclear energy”: promotion of research, 
dissemination of information, health and safety, investment, joint undertakings, supplies, 
safeguards, property ownership, the nuclear common market and external relations (see 
Grunwald 2003 and Schärf 2008 for details on primary and secondary law). The EAEC sub-
policies feature different modes of governance (see Wolf 2009): supranational law-making 
and law harmonisation prevail in the chapters on health and safety as well as the nuclear 
common market. The chapters on promotion of research, dissemination of information, 
investment, and joint undertakings mainly provide “soft” measures to foster research and 
investments in the nuclear sector. The chapter on supplies established, inter alia, the Euratom 
Supply Agency (ESA) – the EU’s first agency – in order to organise and supervise a fair 
supply of nuclear fuels throughout the EU. The section on safeguards authorises the European 
Commission to directly monitor anti-proliferation measures in the member states and to 
impose, if necessary, immediate sanctions (Howlett 1990). Finally, the chapter on external 
relations enables the EAEC to cooperate, within the limits of its jurisdiction, with other EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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organisations  or states. While the member states have transferred several important 
competences regarding nuclear energy policy to the supranational level, many Euratom 
provisions are optional and key decisions remain with the national governments (such as the 
fundamental choices to use nuclear energy, to foster the nuclear sector or to impose certain 
additional nuclear safety standards) (Grunwald 2003). 
Euratom did not develop as hoped for by Monnet and others in the 1950s and 1960s. Today, 
nuclear energy provides less than half of the electric energy produced in the EU. Most 
European countries do not plan to build new nuclear power plants. Supranational research on 
nuclear issues has not superseded national research apart from some cost-intensive projects 
(on nuclear fusion see Wolf 2007). In the absence of shortages of ores and nuclear fuels so 
far, the EAEC’s provisions on supply have never played a noteworthy role (cf. ECJ 1971). 
Euratom’s safeguards policy has lost much of its significance after the establishment of a 
global anti-proliferation regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Gmelin 
2007). Maybe Euratom’s most important achievements are the uniform safety standards on 
radiation protection enacted after the Chernobyl disaster (Grunwald 1986, 2003) and 
obligations for some new Eastern European member states to either adhere to certain safety 
standards regarding nuclear installations or to shut down their Soviet-style reactors (Grunwald 
2000). However, due to the Chernobyl disaster, minor nuclear incidents, and general risk 
perceptions, most European citizens oppose nuclear energy, although attitudes considerably 
vary from country to country (Eurobarometer 2010). Nuclear energy is mostly seen as a 
national policy issue – Most EU citizens have never heard of Euratom. And member state 
governments recently decided to circumvent the EAEC framework by cooperating on a 
couple of nuclear energy issues on an intergovernmental basis (Sauter/Grashof 2007). 
The governments of the EU member states usually strongly disagree when it comes to nuclear 
energy issues (Sauter 2009). As a consequence, the Euratom Treaty, unlike the EU and E(E)C 
Treaties, has never been amended in substance (Wolf 2006). Therefore the European 
Parliament’s legislative powers under the Euratom Treaty have never been strengthened, and 
the EAEC is mainly governed by the Council (major decisions) and the European 
Commission (day-to-day politics). Even the Treaty of Lisbon only adapted the Euratom 
Treaty’s institutional and financial provisions to the EU’s new legal framework. That is why 
the EASC, unlike the ECSC (which expired in 2002), is still a separate political reality. After 
the EU absorbed the EC and its legal personality because of the Lisbon Treaty, Euratom is the 
only European Community left. Some observers call it the “failed Community” (Wegener 
2007: 7; Weilemann 1983: 157), and especially civil society actors and green parties call for 
abolishing the EAEC or unilateral withdrawing from the Euratom Treaty (Mayer/Petri 2006; 
Wegener 2007). On the other hand, EAEC experts highlight the unique supranational nuclear 
safety regime and maintain that the Euratom Treaty is also beneficial for member states 
without nuclear power plants (Grunwald 2007). 
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3.   An analysis of ECJ case law on Euratom 
3.1. Euratom and the law-based neo-functionalist approach 
In its more than 50 years of existence, the EAEC has adopted a considerable body of 
secondary law (on the “Euratom acquis”, see European Commission 2007; Grunwald 2003; 
Schärf 2008). However, nearly no spill-overs of Euratom law to other policies (e.g. general 
energy, economic, health, environmental or security and defence policies) have occurred. An 
intergovernmentalist analysis which lays emphasis on member states/governments interests 
provides good explanations in this regard (see Moravcsik 1998 and Weilemann 1983 for the 
early EAEC years and Sauter 2009 for recent Euratom developments). An examination of the 
ecological, economical and technical framework conditions of European nuclear energy 
policy yields additional insights (Wolf 2009). Nevertheless, these approaches cannot explain 
why the specific dynamics and logics highlighted by law-based neo-functionalism do not 
seem to (fully) work in the case of Euratom. Against this backdrop, this section tries to 
provide a necessary “fresh infusion of data” (Mattli/Slaughter 1995: 189). 
Mattli and Slaughter do not “offer specific hypotheses” (1998: 179) which could be directly 
used for theory testing case studies (cf. George/Bennett 2005). However, they clearly indicate 
which actors and mechanisms trigger legal integration from their point of view. Firstly, they 
describe preliminary proceedings according to Art. 177 TEC (latter Art. 234 TEC, now Art. 
267 TFEU which also applies to the EAEC) as “a framework for links between the Court and 
subnational actors” (Burley/Mattli 1995: 58) that enables the ECJ as well as individuals, 
companies or national courts to pursue their self-interests using EU law against the member 
states and their national law (see also Mattli/Slaughter 1995: 185, 1998: 180-183). Secondly, 
Burley (Slaughter) and Mattli stress that the Court cooperates with the Commission. The 
“ECJ uses the EC Commission as a political bellwether […] and successfully encouraged the 
increased use of the Article 169 [now Art. 258 TFEU which also applies to the EAEC] 
procedure [i.e. actions against a member state initiated by the Commission]” (Burley/Mattli 
1993: 71-72). These assertions imply the following theoretical assumptions: 
1.  Political and legal dynamics (including spill-overs) can be expected because   
supranational and subnational actors try to overcome national law in order to pursue 
their interests by means of preliminary proceedings. 
2.  Political and legal dynamics (including spill-overs) can be expected since the 
European Commission tries to extend the EAEC’s and/or its competences by means of 
actions against member states. 
Burley (Slaughter) and Mattli discuss several details of the EU’s judicial system that they 
deem crucial for their approach. However, they do not elaborate in a systematic manner on 
potential context factors or framework conditions that might be necessary for the occurrence 
of the highlighted mechanisms and spill-over processes (e.g. specific legal and/or factual 
circumstances such as certain enabling clauses, a particular number of key actors or specific EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2011-010a.htm    8 
 
constellations of actors). This omission could reduce the explanatory power of law-based neo-
functionalism (see 4.). 
3.2. Comparing sectoral and cross-sectoral treaties 
All founding treaties of European integration share a similar institutional framework and are 
based on supranational legal doctrines such as supremacy and direct effect of European law 
(cf. Weiler 1999). But the former EC Treaty (now Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union) is a cross-sectoral treaty whereas the Euratom Treaty and the expired ECSC Treaty are 
sectoral administrative treaties (Grunwald 2007: 6). Thus, is it possible to compare the EAEC 
to the former EC (now EU except Euratom) from the perspective of law-based neo-
functionalism? If we take the approach developed by Burley (Slaughter) and Mattli seriously, 
a comparative analysis should be possible. They do not restrict their arguments to certain 
policy fields, but mainly base their assumptions on the existence of a legal and judicial 
framework that enables subnational actors to indirectly initiate preliminary proceedings and a 
supranational actor such as the Commission to bring actions against the member states. If 
such a framework exists, they assume that both subnational and supranational actors will 
make use of it and try to overcome national law in order to pursue their respective interests 
(see 3.1.). Euratom shares a framework like this with the other supranational parts of the EU. 
Therefore, one may conclude that a comparative study taking Burley’s  (Slaughter’s) and 
Mattli’s approach as analytical starting point is feasible. 
However, which concept or meaning of political spill-over shall be applied? Burley 
(Slaughter) and Mattli clearly had cross-sectoral spill-overs in mind (cf. Burley/Mattli 1993: 
66). Can such spill-overs take place in the context of a sectoral supranational organisation 
such as the EAEC? Although Euratom’s legislative enabling provisions are rather limited, it 
cannot be ruled out, from a theoretical point of view, that Euratom measures might spill over 
to neighbouring policies, especially if such an expansion can be justified by functional 
reasons. ECJ case law supports this consideration, as subsection 3.4. shows in more detail. 
For example, the Euratom health and safety chapter is rather narrow in scope since it mainly 
deals with laying down and controlling basic standards regarding nuclear radiation protection 
(cf. Art. 30-39 Euratom Treaty). Nevertheless, the Court already expanded the EAEC health 
policy to planning and construction policy (ECJ 2002) and civil law (ECJ 2009), the Council 
expanded it to the regulation of the free movement of foodstuffs (ECJ 1991), and the 
Commission unsuccessfully tried to extend it to security and defence policy (ECJ 2005, 
2006b). These examples are, in both qualitative and quantitative terms, not as impressive as 
many spill-overs under the EC/TFEU Treaty. However, they still can be regarded as spill-
overs. 
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3.3. Euratom before the Court 
Since a couple of years, the ECJ (i.e. the Court of Justice, the General Court (i.e. the former 
Court of First Instance), and the Civil Service Tribunal) decides more than 1000 cases 
annually, and it is not easy to single out relevant judgements on Euratom because of the sheer 
magnitude of ECJ case law. Moreover, dozens of cases concerning the EAEC do hardly touch 
substantial Euratom law since they are civil actions, arbitration proceedings, or disputes 
involving the EU civil service. Aside from that, there are several rulings involving certain 
aspects of Euratom law, but EC and/or EU law clearly dominate these cases. All these 
judgments have to be sorted out in order to compile relevant cases in which EAEC primary 
and/or secondary law prevail(s). This study draws on four different sources to find and select 
Euratom rulings: (a) key case law on Euratom compiled by the European Commission (2007: 
27); (b) Euratom cases available at the ECJ’s website (all judgments since mid-1997, assigned 
to different policy fields, are accessible at the Court’s homepage); (c) the digest of ECJ case 
law (répertoire de jurisprudence), a systematic and sectoral collection of cases (including 
rather old rulings) by the Court (ECJ 2010); (d) academic literature (e.g. Grunwald 2003; 
Schärf 2010). This means that the author has not checked every case since 1958 for Euratom 
relevance, but several reliable (meta) sources have been exploited in order to find as much 
relevant case law as possible. Burley (Slaughter) and Mattli (and many other scholars) did not 
even try to work with a specific representative sample of ECJ rulings compiled on the basis of 
certain criteria. They  just picked and cited seminal judgments which supported their 
arguments (for a supporter of intergovernmentalism also using this questionable method, see 
e.g. Garrett 1995). 
The result of this research for data is a compilation of only 30 cases which mainly concern 
EAEC primary and/or secondary law (see Table 2 for the full list). Given the sheer mass of 
ECJ cases, this small number already can be interpreted as another indicator of the rather 
meagre legal development of the EAEC. This sample does not claim to include all (relevant) 
Euratom cases, but cross-checks between the different sources suggest that it is a 
representative compilation – at least far more representative, transparent and systematic than 
Burley’s (Slaughter’s) and Mattli’s selection of judgments. If one estimates that there was 
approximately one relevant case per year in recent decades and even less rulings in the first 
years of Euratom, there might be up to 50 or so relevant cases in total. In this regard, the 
sample includes ca. 60% of relevant Euratom rulings (probably more). However, it is likely to 
contain more than 90% of all important EAEC cases since most sources used for this 
compilation focus on significant judgments, and most cases are mentioned by at least two out 
of the four sources. Cross-checks and frequency distribution regarding the known rulings 
imply that most of the few unknown cases handed down in the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s 
probably are rather similar and unspectacular actions initiated by the Commission against a 
member state that failed to fulfil certain obligations under Euratom secondary law (mainly 
non-implementation of directives). This type of cases usually does not imply spill-overs (see 
3.4. and 3.4.2.). 
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Table 1: Relevant ECJ case law on Euratom 
Parties or procedure  Number of cases 
Commission v. member state   15 
Private party v. Commission (and Council)  7 
Preliminary ruling  3 
Member state v. Commission  1 
Member state v. Council  1 
Commission v. Council  1 
European Parliament v. Council  1 
Other  1 
Total  30 
Source: compiled by the author. 
3.4. A neo-functionalist analysis of the case law 
The next table provides a list of the Euratom cases (first column), expectations of the law-
based neo-functionalist approach as to spill-overs (second column), findings regarding spill-
overs (third column), and short summaries or comments (fourth column). The most important 
judgments  (from a neo-functionalist point of view) are discussed in more detail in the 
following subsections. 
Table 2: Overview of the Euratom cases 
Euratom case decided by 
the European Court of 
Justice 
(in chronological order) 
Law-based neo-
functionalism expects 
a higher probability of 
spill-over 
Actual 
spill-
over 
Short summary or comment 
Case 7/71, Commission v. 
France [1971] ECR 1003 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No 
France has to cooperate with the 
Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) as 
prescribed by the Euratom Treaty 
Opinion 1/78 [1978] ECR 
2151  No  No 
ECJ interpreted the scope of 
certain Euratom policies against 
the background of an IAEA treaty 
Case 187/87, Saarland and 
Others v. Minister for 
Industry and Others 
[1988] ECR 5013 
Yes (Preliminary 
ruling)  No  See 3.4.1. 
Case C-62/88, Greece v. 
Council [1990] ECR I-
1527 
No  No  See 3.4.3. 
Case C-246/88, 
Commission v. Italy 
[1991] ECR I-2049 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case C-70/88, European 
Parliament v. Council 
[1991] ECR I-4529 
No  Yes  See 3.4.3. EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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Case C-376/90, 
Commission v. Belgium 
[1992] ECR I-6153 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state did not fail to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case C-308/90, Advanced 
Nuclear Fuels v. 
Commission [1993] ECR 
I-309 
No  No 
Company unsuccessfully 
challenged a sanction imposed by 
the Commission (safeguards) 
Case C-107/91, ENU v. 
Commission [1993] ECR 
I-599 
No  No 
Commission unlawfully did not 
decide on a Company’s application 
to ask the ESA to buy the 
Company’s products 
Case C-95/92, 
Commission v. Italy 
[1993] ECR I-3119 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case C-146/91, KYDEP 
v. Council and 
Commission [1994] ECR 
I-4199 
No  No 
Greek peasants unsuccessfully 
applied for compensation for post-
Chernobyl measures  
Case C-135/94, 
Commission v. Italy 
[1995] ECR I-1805 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Cases T-458/93 and T-
523/93, ENU v. 
Commission [1995] ECR 
II-2459 
No  No 
The ESA is not obliged to buy and 
resell (all) nuclear products made 
in the EU 
Cases T-149/94 and T-
181/94, KKW Lippe-Ems 
v. Commission [1997] 
ECR II-161 
No   No 
Company unsuccessfully 
challenged a decision of the 
Commission not to approve supply 
contracts with certain Asian 
producers 
Case C-357/95 P, ENU v. 
Commission [1997] ECR 
I-1329 
No  No 
Company unsuccessfully appealed 
against the judgment in cases T-
458/93 and T-523/93 (see above) 
Case C-21/96, 
Commission v. Spain 
[1997] ECR I-5481 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case C-161/97 P, KKW 
Lippe-Ems v. 
Commission [1999] ECR 
I-2057 
No  No 
Company unsuccessfully appealed 
against the judgment in cases T-
149/94 and T-181/94 (see above) 
Case C-146/01, 
Commission v. Belgium 
[2002] ECR I-5117 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case C-29/99, 
Commission v. Council 
[2002] ECR I-11221 
Yes (Commission v. 
member states)  Yes  See 3.4.2. 
Case C-483/01, 
Commission v. France 
[2003] ECR I-4961 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case C-484/01, 
Commission v. France 
[2003] ECR I-4975 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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Case C-218/02, 
Commission v. United 
Kingdom [2004] ECR I-
1241 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case C-177/03, 
Commission v. France 
[2004] ECR I-11671 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case C-61/03, 
Commission v. United 
Kingdom [2005] ECR I-
2477 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  See 3.4.2. 
Case C-65/04, 
Commission v. United 
Kingdom [2006] ECR I-
2239 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  See 3.4.2. 
Case C-459/03, 
Commission v. Ireland 
[2006] ECR I-4635 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No 
Ireland violated Euratom law by 
instituting proceedings against the 
United Kingdom under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea  
Cases C-123/04 and C-
124/04, INDB, Siemens v. 
UBS, TUEC [2006] ECR 
I-7861 
Yes (Preliminary 
ruling)  No   See 3.4.1. 
Case C-155/06, 
Commission v. United 
Kingdom [2007] ECR I-
103 
Yes (Commission v. 
member state)  No  Member state failed to fully 
implement a Euratom directive 
Case T-240/04, France v. 
Commission [2007] ECR 
II-4035 
No  No 
Commission does not have the 
competence to adopt regulations 
regarding communications on 
nuclear investment projects 
Case C-115/08, 
Oberösterreich v. ČEZ as 
[2009] ECR I-10265 
Yes (Preliminary 
ruling)  Yes  See 3.4.1. 
Source: compiled by the author. 
3.4.1.  Preliminary rulings 
As to the role of preliminary rulings (first theoretical assumption, see 3.1.), the low number of 
such judgments (3 out of 30, or 10%) indicates that subnational actors in proceedings before 
national courts hardly try to reinforce their position by means of Euratom law. A qualitative 
analysis shows that only in one out of these three judgments, the ECJ extended Euratom law 
to another policy field (political spill-over): 
•  In the case Saarland and Others v. Minister for Industry and Others (ECJ 1988), the 
Court ruled that the Commission –  which has the right to deliver an opinion on 
transnational risks of nuclear contamination by disposals of nuclear waste – obviously 
has to be informed about plans to dispose of nuclear waste before such a disposal is 
authorised by a member state. Apparently, this decision did not imply a political spill-
over. EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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•  In the case Industrias Nucleares do Brasil SA, Siemens AG v. UBS AG, Texas 
Utilities Electric Corporation  (ECJ 2006a), a civil law dispute, the Court had the 
opportunity to extend certain provisions of the Euratom Treaty to nuclear undertakings 
from countries outside the territory of the EAEC. It decided not to do so, as the 
Euratom Supply Agency suggested. There would not have been potential for 
significant legal or political dynamics even if the ECJ had opted for a wide 
interpretation. 
•  Finally, in the “Temelín”  case Oberösterreich v. ČEZ  as  (ECJ  2009),  the  Court 
extended the scope of Euratom law to civil law by ruling that member states have to 
accept  official authorisations for operating nuclear power plants by other member 
states since the EAEC provides for a sufficient protection against transnational risks of 
nuclear radiation and contamination. Thus, the  ECJ shields the owners of nuclear 
power plants against civil actions for injunction from other member states (Schärf 
2010; Wolf 2011). Among the cases analysed in this study, this is the only visible 
spill-over emerging from a preliminary ruling. 
3.4.2.  European Commission vs. member states 
As to the role of cases initiated by the Commission against member states (second theoretical 
assumption, see 3.1.), there is a considerable number of such judgments (15 out of 30, or 
50%). However, a qualitative analysis reveals that most of these cases are similar and rather 
unspectacular actions due to poor implementation of certain Euratom directives (see Table 2). 
From an analytical point of view, it does not make sense to discuss these cases usually won by 
the Commission. The mere implementation of a Euratom directive normally does not imply a 
broadening of the scope of EAEC law. Evidence from the EC shows that spill-overs are likely 
to occur if the Commission tries to overcome sectoral national law by referring to rather 
abstract European primary law (e.g. the economic freedoms) (see 4.3.). The Commission did 
not follow that pattern in the 15 cases in question. Most of these cases cannot be considered to 
contain any aspects of political spill-overs at all (see Table 2). Thus, these rulings are not 
discussed here, but the concluding section (4.) reflects, inter alia, about the Commission’s 
limited role and legal means in Euratom disputes. There are only three mentionable 
judgments: 
•  In a case against the Council (ECJ 2002), the Commission argued that the EAEC’s 
legislative competences under the health and safety chapter were much broader than 
interpreted by the member states. The Court agreed with the Commission and found 
that the provisions of that chapter had to be interpreted broadly in order to give them 
practical effect. According to the Court, Euratom possesses, inter alia, “legislative 
competence to establish, for the purpose of health protection, an authorisation system 
which must be applied by the Member States” (ECJ 2002: para. 89). Because of its 
spill-overs to planning and construction policy, this judgment can be seen as the most 
important Euratom ruling so far (Schärf 2010: 83). The Commission did not lose time 
and based two far-reaching proposals for Euratom directives on this judgment (Trüe 
2003). However, the Council did not adopt these initiatives for several years (Sauter 
2009; Wolf 2009).  
•  In two actions against the United Kingdom (ECJ 2005, 2006b), the Commission tried 
to extend the scope of Euratom law to security and defence policy. The Commission EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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argued that Euratom secondary law applies to the decommissioning of a military 
nuclear reactor (ECJ 2005) and to the safety risks arising from a damaged nuclear-
powered submarine (ECJ 2006b). Though the Court showed some sympathy for a 
better protection of the population against nuclear radiation, it did not share the 
Commission’s opinion and ruled that Euratom law generally does not apply to military 
installations and activities. Thus, the ECJ did not follow the cross-sectoral approach of 
the Commission, in contradiction to what neo-functionalism suggests. These two 
rulings are only partially convincing. While it is rather obvious that the founders of the 
EAEC Treaty (especially France) did not want Euratom law to constrain military 
nuclear activities of individual member states (Weilemann 1983: 177), “the Euratom 
Treaty broadly defined peaceful activities” and “considered all nuclear dual-use 
activities […] as peaceful” (Mallard 2008: 463). The Euratom Treaty is not 
unambiguous regarding that topic, only a few provisions clearly deal with security and 
defence policy (cf. Art. 24-28, 84 Euratom Treaty). Therefore, from a functional point 
of view, the Commission’s teleological argumentation to apply Euratom’s health and 
safety policy to marginal military nuclear activities, especially when European 
civilians are endangered, is reasonable. The Court prevented, maybe for political 
reasons, two good examples of political spill-over as assumed by law-based neo-
functionalism. 
3.4.3.  Other remarkable cases 
It should be mentioned that the Court approved an exceptional and limited legislative (i.e. 
“positive”) spill-over after the Chernobyl disaster (see Grunwald 1986, 2003). In the case 
European Parliament v. Council (ECJ 1991), it ruled that a regulation on maximum permitted 
levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and of feeding stuffs was rightly based on 
the Euratom Treaty although it harmonised the conditions for the free movement of goods 
within the EU’s internal market. However, in a similar case initiated by Greece against the 
Council (ECJ 1990), the Court decided that a regulation on the conditions governing imports 
of agricultural products originating in third countries following the accident at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant did not have to be based on the Euratom Treaty although it fixes 
maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of goods from third countries 
designated for the internal market. From the perspective of the EEC, this ruling can be 
interpreted as a restriction of the scope of application of the Euratom Treaty. 
A pure intergovernmentalist approach (e.g. Garrett 1995) can rather easily “explain” these 
two judgments as well as the two Commission v. UK cases (ECJ 2005, 2006b) and the 
Temelín ruling (ECJ 2009) since the ECJ followed the interests of the majority of member 
states  involved  in these cases. However, intergovernmentalism fails to shed light on the 
important judgment Commission v. Council (ECJ 2002). In the concluding section, it will be 
explored why the specific mechanisms of political and legal integration highlighted by 
Burley’s  (Slaughter’s) and Mattli’s neo-functionalist approach do not seem to work with 
regard to Euratom. 
   EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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4.  Conclusions 
4.1. Failed assumptions? 
This paper mainly explores how law-based neo-functionalism can contribute to explain the 
legal development of the EAEC in the last decades. The approach developed by Burley 
(Slaughter) and Mattli expects spill-overs (3.2.) because it assumes that supranational and 
subnational actors try to overcome national law in order to pursue their interests by means of 
preliminary proceedings before the ECJ (3.1.). An analysis of case law on Euratom shows that 
there are only a few preliminary rulings (3.3., 3.4.) Subnational actors apparently do not use 
this judicial procedure to pursue their interests by extending Euratom law to other policy 
fields with a little help of the Court (3.4.1.). They rather bring actions against the Commission 
in order to annul Euratom secondary law or to get financial help from the EAEC (see ECJ 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1997). 
Law-based neo-functionalism also assumes political and legal dynamics as a consequence of a 
general strategy of the European Commission to widen the scope of the EAEC’s and/or its 
competences by means of actions against member states (3.1.). There is a considerable 
number of cases initiated by the Commission against individual member states or the Council 
(3.3., 3.4.). However, there is only one case so far in which the ECJ supported the 
Commission in significantly extending Euratom’s legislative competences – And afterwards, 
the Council did not adopt far-reaching proposals for Euratom directives based on this 
judgment (3.4.2.). Thus, law-based neo-functionalism as developed by Burley (Slaughter) and 
Mattli (1993, 1995, 1998) can hardly explain the poor legal integration of the EAEC. Most 
notably, it cannot give reasons for the non-occurrence of the core mechanisms and 
phenomena it postulates. 
4.2.  The reluctance of subnational and supranational actors 
There is an obvious – and maybe superficial – explanation for the above-mentioned (non-) 
behaviour of subnational actors and the Commission: Apparently, Euratom law does not 
provide these actors with viable opportunities or rights to pursue their interests (or the actors 
are not aware of such opportunities). In this regard, one could argue that the Euratom Treaty 
is only a sectoral administrative treaty with rather limited legislative enabling provisions (see 
Grunwald 2007: 6). One might add that the nuclear sector features a rather small number of 
key actors (e.g. major companies and associations) as well as limited economic competition 
and cross-border transactions, partly due to diverging technical systems. However, the overall 
number of actors in the European nuclear sector that could initiate preliminary proceedings 
should not be underestimated: Every citizen or subnational entity (cf. ECJ 1988) could take 
legal action against member state authorities because of, say, an alleged violation of Euratom 
nuclear safety directives. Such lawsuits might lead to preliminary proceedings. But even 
many legal experts do not know Euratom law. In the “Temelín”  case  (ECJ 2009), for 
example, both the national court and the Advocate General did not realise that Euratom law 
was affected and played a decisive role (Schärf 2010; Wolf 2011). EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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Spill-overs expected by law-based neo-functionalism would be possible if subnational and 
supranational actors saw Euratom law as an instrument to overcome national law in various 
policy fields  and contexts. However, most ordinary citizens do not even know that an 
organisation like Euratom exists and regulates certain parts of nuclear energy policy with 
potential impacts on general energy, economic, environmental, health, non-proliferation, 
construction as well as research and development policies. Large companies in the nuclear 
sector are often dominated by or dependent on member state governments. Thus, these firms 
are not likely to bring actions based on Euratom law against their governments. They will 
hardly use legal remedies to get the Euratom Treaty fully implemented or even extended if the 
respective member state governments prefer the status quo. Nuclear companies rather tend to 
exploit the EAEC’s benefits and oppose possible burdens by Euratom law (4.1.). The 
Commission might have learned from its seminal EAEC case against the Council (ECJ 2002) 
that even a wide interpretation of Euratom legislative competences by the Court does not 
mean that the EAEC’s scope is actually broadened because the member states usually have to 
agree on major Euratom measures. Obviously, the mere existence of a supranational judicial 
system does not mean that subnational and supranational actors make use of it and thus spill-
overs emerge. 
4.3. Euratom and the missing mechanism of negative and positive integration  
At this point it becomes obvious that the original neo-functionalist approach lacks 
specification regarding necessary context factors and framework conditions (cf. 3.1.). Against 
this backdrop, an analysis of judicial and legal dynamics in the former EC might help to better 
understand the particular situation under the Euratom Treaty and to improve law-based neo-
functionalism. In all policies somehow related to the common market and its four basic 
freedoms, legal integration is frequently triggered by the interdependence of deregulation 
(negative integration) and reregulation (positive integration) (see Joerges 2003; Scharpf 2000, 
2003): After deregulative measures by the Commission or by the Court (usually activated by 
subnational actors), member states are often interested in limiting future regulatory 
competition. As a consequence, they pass supranational secondary law which they would not 
have adopted without competitive pressure. 
This deregulation-reregulation pattern does not exist in the case of Euratom since the EAEC 
lacks deregulative powers. Euratom provisions regarding the nuclear common market are very 
limited in scope and the other EAEC sub-policies either allow for optional, non-binding 
activities or strict regulative measures (see 2.). Thus, there are hardly any legal opportunities 
to pursue supranational or subnational interests against the national governments by 
instrumentalising the ECJ. In the absence of competitive pressure triggered by subnational or 
supranational actors, governments are usually not interested in “concrete institutional 
requirements with which the member states must comply” (Knill/Lehmkuhl 1999: 1). The 
failed nuclear safety and nuclear waste initiatives (Sauter 2009; Wolf 2009) after the Court’s 
landmark Euratom decision (ECJ 2002) underline that member states predominantly opt for EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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non-harmonisation, especially in a highly disputed area like nuclear energy policy, if there is 
no regulatory competition. 
4.4. Notes regarding a refinement of law-based neo-functionalism 
To sum up, the remarkable explanatory power of intergovernmentalist approaches regarding 
the legal development of Euratom cannot be fully explained by the strong power of member 
state governments at national and supranational level (and their differences of opinion) in this 
policy field. Intergovernmentalism alone is not able to fully explain the non-occurrence of the 
subtle dynamic mechanisms highlighted by law-based neo-functionalism. It appears that a 
supranational judicial system which includes optional preliminary proceedings and is based 
on the legal doctrines of supremacy and direct effect (Weiler 1999) is necessary but not 
sufficient to generate the phenomena described by Burley (Slaughter) and Mattli.  The 
EAEC’s sectoral limitations and the limited number of subnational actors in the European 
nuclear sector should not be overestimated. An analysis that takes the original law-based neo-
functionalist approach seriously has to focus on the law since other factors can be better 
explored with other approaches. From this perspective, an important point seems to be that 
supranational and subnational actors need specific legal provisions that enable them to 
deregulate national law and thus put pressure on member state governments. Euratom lacks 
these legal preconditions. As a consequence, without regulatory competition or exceptional 
external catastrophes like the Chernobyl disaster (Grunwald 1986), there are usually no 
significant incentives for most national governments to adopt supranational secondary law in 
a highly disputed policy field like nuclear energy (Wolf 2009). In contrast, the EC’s (now 
EU’s) common market has a broad legal basis and offers many opportunities for political 
dynamics because of its interdependent politics of deregulation and reregulation. Jean Monnet 
probably did not anticipate this crucial point when he preferred Euratom to the EEC in the late 
1950s. 
The empirical basis of this paper – 30 ECJ cases from a rather exotic policy field – does not 
seem to be sufficient to propose or present a comprehensive revision of law-based neo-
functionalism. Nevertheless, several more or less tentative conclusions towards a refinement 
of this theoretical approach are possible. First of all, the key assumptions of Burley 
(Slaughter) and Mattli (see 3.1.) should not be called into question. Two out of the three 
Euratom cases which showed political spill-overs (ECJ 2002, 2009) actually emerged from 
constellations predicted by law-based neo-functionalism. The third case, an example of 
legislative spill-over (ECJ 1991), was the result of an exceptional external shock. Against this 
backdrop, it is necessary to focus on the cases which did not imply spill-overs although the 
original law-based neo-functionalist approach expected a higher probability of spill-over. The 
findings of this paper and further reflections suggest that 
1.  proceedings initiated by the Commission against individual member states due to poor 
implementation of directives usually do not leave much room for potential spill-overs; 
2.  there is a legal key requirement for “negative”  spill-overs: rather abstract 
supranational provisions that make it possible to deregulate sectoral national law; EIoP     © 2011 by Sebastian Wolf 
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3.  subnational and supranational actors need to know these provisions in oder to be able 
to initiate actions that might lead to spill-overs (negative integration); 
4.  legislative spill-overs (positive integration) are less likely in highly disputed policy 
fields apart from exceptional situations such as external disasters; 
5.  the ECJ does not approve all proposals for spill-overs, but it seems to be less reluctant 
if basic principles of the EU or the respective policy field and/or its own position of 
power are at stake (see Wolf 2011 for an illustrative case study concerning the 
Temelín judgment). 
Future research will have to explore whether a refined version of law-based neo-functionalism 
that takes these considerations into account has more explanatory power and can contribute to 
explain legal (non-) integration in other policy fields. 
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